Boras’s Bad Year

All Star Game, Ballparks, Books, CBA, Cy Young Award, Draft, Fantasy/Roto, Free Agents, Games, Hall Of Fame, History, Hot Stove, Management, Media, MiLB, MLB Trade Deadline, MLB Waiver Trades, MVP, Paul Lebowitz's 2011 Baseball Guide, PEDs, Players, Playoffs, Prospects, Spring Training, Stats, Trade Rumors, World Series

From the heights of Scott Boras’s crowning achievement in baseball by getting $126 million for Jayson Werth, it’s come to this.

Boras’s entire reputation as the go-to agent for max dollars is hinging on how much he gets for Prince Fielder and Edwin Jackson and for how long.

Werth signed with the Nationals on December 6th, 2010; their offer was so preposterous that Boras didn’t bother to leak it to friendly reporters, nor did he try to surpass it with another potentially interested suitor. He accepted it immediately because it was so insane.

It’s gone poorly for him since then.

At mid-season 2011, Francisco Rodriguez made a high-profile change from Paul Kinzer to Boras; K-Rod had a limited no-trade clause in his contract and before Boras could submit a list of teams to which K-Rod could not be traded, Mets GM Sandy Alderson shipped the reliever to the Brewers where he was forced to be a set-up man; K-Rod also agreed to eliminate his appearance kicker of $17.5 million in exchange for free agency at the end of the season. When the closer’s market dried up and with few options to get a long-term deal, K-Rod accepted the Brewers offer of arbitration; unless they trade him, he’s not going to close for them in 2012 either.

Carlos Beltran and Mark Teixeira both fired him.

Jose Reyes resisted Boras’s overtures to leave the Greenbergs.

Ryan Madson thought he had an overpriced deal with the Phillies before something—no one seems to know what—happened to sabotage a $44 million contract; the Phillies walked away from Madson and signed Jonathan Papelbon.

Boras’s remaining free agent clients includes Johnny Damon, Manny Ramirez, Jason Varitek, Rick Ankiel; Ivan Rodriguez and J.D. Drew.

Damon will play in 2012, but he’s not getting a long-term contract; Ramirez is calling around on his own looking for work; Varitek could find a job somewhere, but does he want to put on a non-Red Sox uniform without the “C” on his chest? Ankiel will get a job, but it might be as a fourth outfielder; Pudge will sign somewhere and as a part-timer; Drew sounds willing to play, but he’s doing his “J.D. Drew thing”—if someone pays him and it’s the “right” situation, he’ll sign.

The new collective bargaining agreement affects Boras’s usual draft dance with what amounts to a salary cap on bonuses and a tighter slotting system to discourage heavy payouts. This makes it impossible for Boras to hold clubs hostage with demands for Major League contracts for his drafted clients.

On the positive side, somehow Boras coaxed the Diamondbacks into giving journeyman Willie Bloomquist a 2-year, $3.8 million deal; and Bruce Chen finally has some moderate security with a contract for 2-years and $9 million with the Royals.

Fielder is said to want a 10-year contract and presumably he’s looking for $200+ million; Jackson will want what C.J. Wilson received—nearly $80 million.

Jackson has plenty of options because pitching is so scarce; Fielder doesn’t.

It’s been a bad year.

But Boras has pulled so many tricks out of his evil pouch so many times that it’s unwise to doubt him.

His grip on baseball’s heart could be loosening.

Or he might find a way to tighten it.

The cornered animal is at its most dangerous.

Especially the Boras species.

//

MLB Draft Dollars And The Strategy Of Spending

All Star Game, Books, Draft, Fantasy/Roto, Free Agents, Games, Hall Of Fame, Management, Media, MiLB, MLB Trade Deadline, Players, Playoffs, Trade Rumors, Uncategorized

Why do I get the feeling that with all the talk about clubs spending, spending and spending some more in the MLB Draft, that 2011 will wind up going down as the year that teams overspent and got little return?

We can go up and down, back and forth with the arguments for carting wheelbarrows of cash in the draft and bringing in top-quality talent, but the fact remains that the draft is the ultimate crapshoot.

As opposed to one of the most idiotic assertions in Moneyball that the genius Billy Beane was counting cards in a casino (repeated by Michael Lewis in the afterword/extra chapter of the paperback version as if saying something stupid once wasn’t enough), all you can do with drafted players is hope.

Naturally giving them an opportunity to play in the majors instead of continually bringing in veterans is a key to their development and becoming useful big leaguers, but the truth about the draft is that you don’t know until you know.

Picking a year at random (and I’m actually picking a year at random) with 2004 and the 1st round.

How many “star” players are there? There are two: Justin Verlander and Jered Weaver.

Apart from that, you have useful cogs (Huston Street; Jeff Niemann; Phil Hughes; Neil Walker; J.P. Howell; Gio Gonzalez); the underdeveloped (Bill Bray; Homer Bailey; Blake DeWitt; Philip Humber); and the busts (Matt Bush; Jon Poterson; Greg Golson).

Being a 1st round pick and getting a load of money increases expectations and the amount of time a player is going to get with the organization. The bigger amounts of attention and money they receive, the more a club is going to want to get some kind of return on that investment; that goes a long way in keeping a player employed and moving up the ladder even if he doesn’t deserve it.

The obvious and easy response to any failure or perceived success is to go all in. So if teams are seen to be “winning” with the Moneyball system, that’s what will come en vogue; if teams win by signing veteran players, that will be the new strategy.

It’s the same with the draft and development—others will copy it while it appears to be working; then they’ll move on to something else.

The drafted players have taken advantage of MLB’s complete lack of competence in implementing the bonus slots. The reliance on the draft to find players not to collect and trade, but to use is making them more valuable and the bonuses reflect that. But simply spending isn’t the answer on the big league level nor in the draft; it’s a matter of picking correctly.

This strategy of spending might be a one-and-out, because judging from history, it’s unlikely to succeed as well as the money or public accolades indicate it should.

//